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Hajicek: Hajicek: Settlement in Securities Fraud:

SETTLEMENT IN SECURITIES
FRAUD: IS SETTLEMENT
PROMOTING LITIGATION?
In re Jiffy Lube Securities Litigation'

I. INTRODUCTION
In the complex securities fraud arena, partial pretrial settlement in cases
involving multiple defendants would appear to reduce litigation in the dispute.
However, conflict over the proper method of allocating responsibility for a damage
award among settling and non-settling defendants can in fact increase litigation.
Federal courts disagree as to which method most fairly and equitably apportions
damage liability. In re Jiffy Lube SecuritiesLitigation is the most recent case that
touches upon the issue of damage allocation among settling and non-settling
defendants. This Note will address competing policy considerations which drive
courts to choose different allocative methods.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The shareholders of Jiffy Lube brought this consolidated class action against
Jiffy Lube International, Inc. (JLI), its officers, underwriters, securities brokers,
and auditors Ernst & Young. 2 Plaintiffs alleged that in 1986 and 1987, JLI issued
registration statements, prospectuses, other SEC reports, annual reports, proxy
statements, and press releases which contained false representations and misleading
omissions regarding JLI's financial health. From July 22, 1986 through June 9,
1989, plaintiffs estimated damages of over $100 million.4
In August 1989, settlement negotiations began between plaintiffs and all
defendants with the exception of defendant Ernst & Young.'
During the
negotiation process, plaintiffs initiated informal discovery regarding JLI's financial
condition and the fraud claims.' Ernst & Young contends that it was not given
notice of the discovery proceedings as they were occurring.7

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

927 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 157-58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In October 1989, the negotiating parties agreed to settle in the amount of $9.5
million.8 Penzoil, which was not a party to the suit but who had agreed to assist
JLI financially, conditioned the settlement upon a bar order which would prevent
defendant Ernst & Young from seeking future claims of indemnity or contribution
from settling defendants or Penzoil. 9
The parties presented the settlement proposal for approval to the United
States District Court in the District of Maryland.1" After the Rule 23(e) hearing
to determine the adequacy of the settlement for the class of plaintiffs, the District
Court entered a final order and judgment approving the settlement for $9.5 million
and the bar order which precluded Ernst & Young from seeking future claims
against settling defendants and Penzoil." A portion of the settlement agreement
contained a clause which permitted Ernst & Young to use the settlement amount
as a setoff of any future judgment against it related to this suit. 2 However, the
clause deferred the method in which the setoff would be calculated until a future
judgment was entered. 3
Ernst & Young appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stating that the District Court erred in two respects. 4 First, Ernst & Young
stated that the bar order was approved without a hearing on fairness which focused
on Ernst & Young's interests.'5 Secondly, Ernst & Young contended that the
settlement agreement, which delayed determination of the method of set off until
the time of a future judgment, exposed them to certain risks.' 6 Ernst & Young
was concerned that such delay created a risk that it would be forced to pass on its
right to contribution from settling defendants without knowing the extent of its
potential liability.' 7
The Fourth Circuit vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case
stating that the District Court's failure to state the method of setoff when the
settlement was approved created an unacceptable financial risk to Ernst &
Young.' 8 When a pretrial settlement is achieved in a securities fraud context, the
method of setoff must be determined at the time the settlement is approved by the
trial court so that all parties may be apprised of the financial consequences
associated with the chosen method. 19

8. Id. at 158.
9. Id. at 157-58.
10. Id. at 158.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. ld.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 161-62.
19. Id. at 161.
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Il. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The availability and effectiveness of settlement in the securities fraud arena
developed around a number of competing policies. Such competing policies
include equitable concerns such as fairness and deterrence." Fairness and
deterrence issues include which party should bear the burden of a "bad"
settlement 2

and to what extent a liable defendant should be financially

responsible for liability. 2

Other policy concerns include promotion of

2
24
settlement, 23 avoidance of collusion between parties, reduction of litigation 5
and adherence to traditional tort recovery principles.2
The right to contribution among joint wrongdoers in the securities fraud
context is a firmly established principle of law. 27 Federal courts recognizing a
right to contribution in the securities fraud context find an implied right of
contribution in the statutory language. 28 Federal courts justify recognition of an
implied right to contribution on equitable principles.29

20. Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 550 (D. Colo. 1989).
21. In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Comment, Multiple
Defendant Settlement in 10b-5: Good Faith Contribution Bar, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 1253, 1276 (1989).
22. See Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Mulvaney, 827
F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1987); Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 550; McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp.
1251, 1276 (D. Del. 1978); Comment, supra note 21, at 1276.
23. See Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943,950 n.11 (9th Cir. 1976); Dalton v. Alston
& Bird, 741 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. 11. 1990); Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 550-51; In re Atlantic Fin.
Management Inc. Secs. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (D. Mass. 1988).
24. See Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1230; Dalton, 741 F. Supp. at 158; Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1017;
Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1259; Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions Under
Rule 10-b, 66 IowA L. REV. 533, 549 (1981); Comment, supra note 21, at 1261 n.48.
25. See Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231; MFS Mun. Income Trust v. American Medical Int'l, Inc., 751
F. Supp. 279, 285 (D. Mass. 1990); Dalton, 741 F. Supp. at 160; Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 553;
Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1018; Comment, supra note 21, at 1274.
26. See Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231; Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir.
1989); United States Indus. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1261 (10th Cir. 1988);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885 (3)(1979).
27. Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1015 (citing Smith, 827 F.2d at 560; Tucker v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 646 F.2d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 558 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Heizer Corp. v.
Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1979); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 637 F. Supp. 938,
940 (D. Mass. 1986); In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-48 (D.D.C. 1981));
see also Note, All Things Being Unequal: Use of the Doctrine of Relative Culpability in Apportioning
Contribution, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 769, 771-72 (1988) (citing Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467
(3d Cir. 1967); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 647 (1972)).
28. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 550. But see Chutich v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 759 F. Supp.
1403, 1404-05 (D. Minn. 1991) (the court did not allow contribution in a securities fraud action stating
that no implied right to contribution exists and that contribution is only available where that right is
specifically provided for in the language in the statute. The court grounded its holding on two
Supreme Court cases. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90
(1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981)).
29. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 550.
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The equitable principles of fairness and deterrence allow federal courts to
legitimize an implied right to contribution." Contribution promotes fairness in
that it provides a mechanism so that all wrongdoers shall be responsible for a
portion of the damage. 31 Contribution similarly provides a deterrent effect
because all wrongdoers realize they cannot escape the ultimate responsibility for
paying a portion of a damage award which is the result of their wrongdoing. 2
However, contribution necessarily provides an incentive not to settle because33
non-settling defendants can file contribution claims against settling defendants.
Preserving a non-settling defendant's right to contribution vis-a-vis the settling
defendants, diminishes the advantage of pretrial settlement and likewise makes
settlement unlikely.34
To counter the disincentive to settle, federal courts engage two methods to
block non-settling defendants' rights to contribution where a partial pretrial
settlement has been reached.35 Some federal courts employ the first method by
applying state settlement bar statutes.36 In the absence of a federal statute
outlining the effect of settlement on contribution, federal courts have turned to
state statutes, commonly referred to as settlement bar statutes, for guidance in
determining the rights of the parties where a partial settlement in federal securities
fraud action has been reached.37 Generally, the state settlement bar statutes allow
each defendant to "buy its peace" and conditions settlement upon the issuance of
an order which bars3 non-settling defendants' right to receive contribution from
settling defendants.
A second approach employed in the federal courts is to imply a settlement
bar rule as a matter of federal common law.3 9 The basis for finding a common

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1016.
34. Id.
35. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 550-51.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 550; see Comment, supra note 21, at 1261 n.48 (citing the twenty-five states which have
settlement bar statutes including: ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-61-205
(1987); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (1987);
DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6304 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-15 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 6-806 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302 (Supp. 1988); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 50, § 20 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, § 4 (West 1986); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 537.060 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-5 (1986); N.Y. GEN.
OBUG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-4
(1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West
Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.445 (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8327 (Purdon 1982); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 10-6-8 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-18 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11105 (1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (1984)).
38. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 550.
39. Id. at 550-51; see also Smith, 827 F.2d at 560; Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566,
578 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982). But see Chutich, 759 F. Supp. at 1404-05 (not
recognizing an implied right of contribution in the federal securities fraud context).
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law settlement bar right stems from the federal court's policy of encouraging
settlement.40
In the securities fraud context, the majority of federal courts have adopted
one method in addressing the competing goals inherent in partial pretrial
settlement. 41 This method involves a combination of allowing contribution
among joint wrongdoers coupled with the issuance of a bar order extinguishing the
non-settling defendants' right to contribution.42 This combination satisfies the
43
equitable objective of contribution while continuing to encourage settlement.
However, reconciliation of these two policies does not fully address the adequacy
of any settlement.
The method with which to apportion liability among defendants upon
reaching a partial pretrial settlement directly affects the amount of future litigation
for all parties. Currently, no majority approach exists as to the proper
apportionment method." The three most common approaches include the "pro
tonto" method, the "pro rata" method and the "relative culpabilities" or
"proportionate" method.45 The mechanics and practical implications of each
method in relation to settlement and future litigation are fully addressed below.

A. The "ProTonto" Method
The "pro tonto" method provides that the amount of payment by the nonsettling defendant is the amount of the judgment less the amount of the
settlement. 46 By way of example, suppose that D1 settles for $100,000 while D2

40. Van Bronkhorst,529 F.2d at 950 n.1; Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 551. Courts are beginning
to reanalyze the legitimacy of the implied right of contribution. Chutich, 759 F. Supp. at 1406-07.
The basis for reanalysis of the implied right to contribution is found in Texas Industries,Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials,Inc., 451 U.S. 630. In Texas Industries, it was held that courts do not have the power to
create contribution rights without at least an implied legislative intent in the statute and that policy
considerations cannot be the basis of implying a contribution right. Id. at 638. The following are
examples of courts which have reanalyzed the legitimacy of the implied right to contribution. In Robin
v. Doctors Oficenters Corp., the court concluded no implied right of contribution exists despite the
holding in Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d at 332-33, which recognized such a right. Robin, 730 F.
Supp. 122, 123-24 (N.D. I1. 1989). It is important to note that Heizer was decided before Texas. See
also Green v. United States Dept. of Labor, 775 F.2d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 1985) (the court held that the
analysis in Texas should be used to determine whether contribution claims are available under federal
statutes); In re Professional Fin. Management Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1285-86 (D. Minn. 1988) (the
court found no implied right of contribution in section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 which was
the basis of the plaintiffs' securities fraud action); Svenningsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood v. PetroLewis Corp., Civil File No. 3-85-921 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 1991); Anderson v. Floresta Ass'n L. P., Civil
File No. 3-87-249 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 1988).
41. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 549-50.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 550-51.
44. In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160-61.
45. Id. at 160-61 n.3.
46. Id.
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decides to go to trial which results in a $500,000 judgment.47 In this example,
D2's liability is reduced by the amount of the settlement, $100,000, thus, D2 must
pay $400,000.48
Proponents of the pro tonto method raise its three distinct advantages. First,
the pro tonto method provides for a shorter and less complicated trial than under
the relative culpabilities method because the jury is not required to apportion
fault.49 Additionally, the trial is less cumbersome because defendants that settled
before trial have no reason to be involved in the litigation, thus creating an end
to the dispute for those that settle. 0
Secondly, the pro tonto method requires a "good faith hearing" to determine
the fairness of the settlement to both settling and non-settling defendants."'
Factors used to determine a fair settlement include the ability to collect a larger
judgment against a settling defendant if the settling defendant had gone to trial and
lost, the strength of the plaintiff's case, the settling defendant's relative culpability
and participation of the judge in the settlement proceedings.5 2
Finally, the pro tonto method, unlike the alternative methods, conforms to the
"one satisfaction" rule. 3 The one satisfaction rule states that the plaintiff is
entitled to only one recovery for an injury incurred equal to the amount of the
judgment regardless of other parties' settlements.5 4 Under the one satisfaction

47. Comment, supra note 21, at 1272.
48. Id.
49. Dalton, 741 F. Supp. at 160; Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1012.
50. Dalton, 741 F. Supp. at 160.
51. Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1017. But see Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1230; Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp.
at 1259 (quoting Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir. 1985)). Donovan criticizes the
fairness .hearing, stating that it:
bog[s] down the settlement process in a miniature trial before trial, for in determining
good faith the court could consider the risk of victory or defeat, the risk of a high or low
verdict, the unknown strengths and weaknesses of the opponent's case, the inexact
appraisal as to the elements of danger, the defendant's solvency and the amount of
insurance coverage.
Donovan, 752 F.2d at 1181 (quotations omitted).
52. Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1017. The author believes that application of the third factor
involving the settling defendant's relative culpability will be of little value in determining whether the
settlement was reached in good faith. It would seem that an accurate measure of settling defendant's
relative culpability would be impossible to determine before trial, especially since a jury will make this
determination. Therefore, even if the parties have engaged in and rely on significant discovery to
determine the settling defendant's relative culpability, this is no indication that a jury would agree with
the determination of percentage fault that the parties believe may be attributed to the settling defendant.
53. Singer, 878 F.2d at 600; United States Indus., 854 F.2d at 1261 (the choice of the pro tonto
method in both of these cases hinged on adherence to the one satisfaction rule).
54. United States Indus., 854 F.2d at 1261; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885(3)
(1979). The Restatement provision states:
[a] payment by any person made in compensation of a claim for a harm for which others
are liable as tortfeasors diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors, at least to the extent
of the payment made, whether or not the party making the payment is liable to the injured
person and whether or not it is so agreed at the time of payment or the payment is made
before or after judgment.
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rule, the focus of the damage amount is the plaintiff's injury, not the underlying
cause of action."5
Critics of the pro tonto method believe that it fosters collusion between
plaintiff and settling defendant because plaintiff is guaranteed the judgment
amount in accepting a low settlement from settling defendant. 6 Additionally, the
pro tonto method allows the plaintiff, rather than the jury, to determine the party
which will endure the majority of the damage liability."'
Courts rejecting the pro tonto method find that the protection offered by the
good faith hearing is illusory because an effective good faith hearing requires "a
full evidentiary hearing on all the parties relative culpabilities." 8 Finally, the pro
tonto method shifts the risk of a low settlement to the non-settling defendants. 9
As other defendants continue to settle, non-settling defendant's risk of being liable
6
for a greater proportion of the judgment increases based on low settlements. 0
B. The "ProRata" Method
The "pro rata" method apportions liability by dividing the amount of the
judgment by the number of liable defendants. 6' Drawing on the previous
example, if D1 and D2 are both liable and D1 settles for $100,000, given that the
judgment is $500,000, then non-settling defendant must pay $250,000, leaving
plaintiff with a total recovery of $350,000.62 Those favoring the pro rata method
of allocation praise its traditional use and easy application.63 The pro rata
method is easily applied in that a court need only determine the liability of each
defendant.6

Id.
55. United States Indus., 854 F.2d at 1261.
56. Adamski, supra note 24, at 549. The author of this casenote points out that when -the pro
tonto method is used, the plaintiff is taking a risk that the non-settling defendant will be able to satisfy
the remainder of the damage award. See MFS Mun. Income Trust, 751 F.2d at 284; Comment, supra
note 21, at 1272; supra notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text. Thus, the plaintiff either recovers the
amount of his damage, or, if non-settling defendant is insolvent, plaintiff will recover less. The relative
culpabilities method will in some cases reward the plaintiff for accepting this risk by allowing a
recovery which can total a greater amount than the damage award. Comment, supra note 21, at 127374.
57. Adamski, supra note 24, at 551. This of course is subject to the good faith hearing. 1d. at
551.
58. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1230; see also Dalton, 741 F. Supp. at 158.
59. Comment, supra note 21, at 1276.
60. Id.
61. In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160-61 n.3.
62. Comment, supra note 21, at 1270.
63. Id. at 1273; Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution Clauses in Underwriting
Agreements, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 223, 255 (1986).
64. Comment, supra note 21, at 1270.
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Initial confusion over statutory language establishing the securities fraud
65
action indicated that the pro rata method was the only method of allocation.
However, later cases established that parties and courts are not limited to the pro
rata allocation method.' Therefore the pro rata method is no longer seen as an
exclusive form of allocation.67
Critics of the pro rata method believe that it is unfair to distribute liability
among joint wrongdoers without considering each defendant's percentage of
fault. 68 Additionally, critics state that its ease in application is of minimal
value.6 9 Ease in application is of minimal value considering that a court requires
little additional evidence to determine the relative culpability of each defendant
over the amount necessary to prove liability of each defendant, which must be
proven regardless of the allocative method implemented.70
C. The "Proportionate"Method
Lastly, the "relative culpabilities" or "proportionate" method allows the fact
finder to determine the percentage of fault of each defendant and a non-settling
defendant shall pay an amount no greater than its percentage of liability of the
total judgment. 71 For example, given the same dollar amounts as in the previous
two examples, assuming non-settling defendant is found to be 60% culpable, the
non-settling defendant would have to pay $300,000 (60% of $500,000).72
. Proponents of the "relative culpabilities" or "proportionate" method believe
that this method provides the fairest allocation of liability because liability is based
exclusively on percentage of fault.73 Initially, it is important to note that under
the relative culpabilities method, a defendant will never pay more than its
percentage of the total judgment determined at trial. 4 Therefore, a defendant
will never be liable for a large judgment created by the settling parties' low
settlement. This aspect of the method is consistent with the equitable doctrine
of contribution and is a characteristic unique to this method. 6

65. Id. (citing Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 136
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971)); see Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F.
Supp. 163, 170 (D. Del. 1974)(held courts could invoke alternative allocative methods).
66. Smith, 827 F.2d at 561.
67. Comment, supra note 21, at 1271.

Id.; see also McLean, 449 F.Supp. at 1276.
In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 772 F.Supp. at 893.
Smith, 827 F.2d at 561.
In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160-61 n.3.
Comment, supra note 21, at 1272.
Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231; Smith, 827 F.2d at 561.
Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231; see Comment, supra note 21, at 1276 and accompanying text
(comparing the relative culpabilities method with the pro tonto method which allocates the risk of low
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

settlement to non-settling defendants).

75. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231.

76. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss1/11
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Unlike the pro tonto method, the relative culpabilities method allocates the
risk of a low settlement to the plaintiff." This occurs because the plaintiff's total
recovery is reduced by settling defendant's proportion of liability of the total
judgment determined at trial. 78 Thus, plaintiff has an incentive to settle for an
amount which approximates defendant's percentage of total liability. 9
Another advantage to the relative culpabilities method is that there is no need
for a good faith hearing to determine the adequacy of a partial settlement.8 0 A
good faith hearing is not required under this method because parties are given the
opportunity to argue percentage fault at trial.8' Additionally, this method does
not require settling defendants to participate in the ongoing litigation because a
settlement bar prohibits future contribution. 2
Finally, this method makes collusion between plaintiff and defendant highly
unlikely. 3 Collusion is avoided because plaintiff should be aware that the
recovery from the settling defendant represents that defendant's percentage of
liability for the entire judgment which will not be recovered from another
defendant, as occurs under the pro tonto method.8
The main concern with the relative culpabilities method is delay in
determining liability until after trial, since the exact amount of setoff cannot be
established until a trial is held to determine apportionment of liability. s This
approach unnecessarily complicates the trial because the jury is required to find
the percentage of each defendant's fault86 and reduces the effect of the judicial
economy found in settlement. 87 Additionally, the delay in determining the
percentage fault will discourage plaintiffs because they will be uncertain as to the
adequacy of any settlement reached.8 Likewise, defendants will be discouraged
from settling because they know that their liability will be limited to their
percentage of fault determined at trial.8 9
Secondly, critics of the relative culpabilities method contend that it fosters
collusion between non-settling defendants to "gang-up" on a settling defendant at
trial by trying to show that the settling defendant was the party with the majority

77. Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1258.
78. Comment, supra note 21, at 1272.
79. Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1259.
80. Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1018.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Comment, supra note 21, at 1274.
84. Id.
85. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231. The relative culpabilities method adds one more task for the jury
beyond what it would have to determine if the pro tonto method was used, namely the percentage of
fault of each defendant. Id. Courts disagree as to the significance of the added litigation (if any) this
creates. See MFS Mun. Income Trust, 751 F. Supp. at 285; Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 553; Atlantic,
718 F. Supp. at 1018.
86. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231.
87. Comment, supra note 21, at 1274.
88. Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1018.
89. Dalton, 741 F. Supp. at 160.
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of the culpability." Thus, in order to achieve the greatest recovery, plaintiff
must necessarily argue that the settling defendant's portion of liability was
minimal, in effect causing plaintiff to not only argue its case, but also that of the
settling defendant. 91
Another criticism of this method centers on its creation of notice problems
in the securities class action setting. 92 For plaintiffs to make an informed
decision regarding the merits of the case, and thus the adequacy of a proposed
settlement, both the amount of the judgment and settling defendant's percentage
of culpability must be known, neither of which is available until after trial. 93
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The court began its analysis by evaluating two contentions which provided
the basis for the trial court's holding that the setoff must be determined at the time
the settlement is approved. 9' First, the appellate court found that the trial court
followed the proper procedure at the Rule 23(e) hearing in determining the fairness
of the settlement.9" The court stated that the main focus of the Rule 23(e)
A separate
hearing is the fairness of the settlement to the plaintiff class.'
hearing is not required to determine the fairness of the settlement to non-settling
defendants unless the pro tonto method of setoff is chosen. 9 7 Additionally, nonsettling defendant's counsel expressed its interests at the Rule 23(e) hearing. 98
Therefore, the court found that the trial court complied with the Rule 23(e)
guidelines and that Ernst & Young was not unfairly treated in the Rule 23(e)
settlement hearing. 99
Next, the court addressed policy issues raised when both the right to
contribution is recognized in conjunction with the issuance of a bar order as a
condition-of settlement. 1°° The court stated that the right to contribution among
parties that are jointly liable in a securities fraud setting is well recognized.'O°
The court also found that this right is tempered by a trend in the courts to issue
a bar order as a condition of settlement which precludes non-settling defendants
from seeking contribution from settling defendants when a partial pretrial
settlement has been reached.10 2 The court found that the trend in courts to issue

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

MFS Mun. Income Trust, 751 F. Supp. at 284.
Comment, supra note 21, at 1274.
Atlantic, 718 F. Supp. at 1018.
Id.
In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d at 158.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 160.
97. Id.; see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
98. In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d at 159.
99. Id. at 160.
100. Id. at 159.
101. Id at 160.
102. Id.
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bar orders in securities cases is a matter of federal common law and is driven by
the policy goal of encouraging settlement. 3
The court found that without the issuance of a bar order, non-settling
defendants could first go to trial in an attempt to avoid liability, and if they lose,
could still file contribution claims against other defendants who had already
settled.'O° Therefore, the court held that if a non-settling defendant's right to
contribution is extinguished, then there must be some assurance that the nonsettling defendant pays only its share of any future judgment. 0 5 Thus, failure
to determine a method which will assure that non-settling defendant pays only its
fair share prejudices both plaintiffs and non-settling defendant." °
The Jiffy Lube court stated that failure to determine the liability
apportionment method at the time the settlement is approved is unfair to the
plaintiff class because they have no way to accurately determine the fairness of
the settlement proposal.0 7 Under the proportionate method, plaintiffs will bear
the risk of a bad settlement, whereas under the pro tonto method, the risk is borne
°
by non-settling defendants.'O
Therefore, the court held that the relative
culpabilities method will necessarily delay determination of the amount of the
setoff which will create problems in properly notifying class members." °
The court also found that failure to determine the liability apportionment
method at the time the settlement is approved by the trial court is unfair to the
non-settling defendants."0 The court's main concern was that the setoff method
employed would dictate Ernst & Young's defense strategy."' Based on the
differing mechanics of each method, the degree of Ernst & Young's wrongdoing
in comparison to other defendants was extremely important under the proportionate
rule, somewhat important under the pro rata rule, and not at all important under
the pro tonto rule. 2 Thus, the court found that Ernst & Young had a right to
know what theory would best serve its interests before trial." 3 Additionally, the
court found that failure to determine the apportionment method before trial leaves
Ernst & Young with the risk of not receiving proper credit for the bar order which
would be issued." 4
By not determining the apportionment method at the time of the settlement,
the court found prejudice toward both plaintiffs and non-settling defendants."'

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at n.2; see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d at 160.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ild.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161-62.
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As a result, the court vacated and remanded the trial court decision for
determination of the proper method."1 6 When a partial pretrial settlement is
achieved in a securities fraud context, the method of setoff must be determined at
the time the settlement is approved by the District Court so that all parties may
7
be apprised of the financial consequences associated with the chosen method."
V. COMMENT

The Jiffy Lube court reaches the correct result in holding that the
apportionment method must be determined at the time the settlement is reached.
Knowing before trial which apportionment method will be used assists the parties
in framing their legal theories for trial'1 8 and helps the parties to determine the
financial risks involved in pursuing litigation.1" 9 However, the persuasive value
of this opinion to other circuits would have been greater had the court taken the
opportunity to determine which apportionment method should be implemented.
To date, only the Second and the Ninth circuits have ruled on the proper
apportionment method in securities fraud context.120 The remaining circuits are
in conflict as to which apportionment method is appropriate.'
Assuming that a court follows the majority approach in recognizing a right
to contribution and issuing a bar order as a condition of settlement, the court's
decision on which apportionment method to adopt is driven by the balancing of
policy concerns.' 22 The court will balance the policy goals 2of3 discouraging
litigation with the equitable concerns of fairness to the parties.
A. Conflicting Policies
The various policy issues needing reconciliation in adopting an apportionment
method revolve around the interplay of encouragement of settlement and the issue
of deciding whether it is more equitable for the plaintiff or non-settling defendant
to bear the risk of a "bad" settlement.' 24 For the plaintiff, a bad settlement
results under the relative culpabilities method where the plaintiff underestimates
the culpability of a settling defendant and settles too low."z For the non-settling

116. Id. at 162.
117. Id. at 157.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 161.
121. Id.; see also Franklin,884 F.2d at 1230-32 (which applied the relative culpabilities method);
Singer, 878 F.2d at 600 (which adopted the pro tonto method).
122. See generallyDalton, 741 F. Supp. at 160; Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1259; Comment,
supra note 21, at 1276.
123. See generallyDalton, 741 F. Supp. at 160; Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1259; Comment,
supra note 21, at 1276.
124. Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1259.
125. Comment, supra note 21, at 1274.
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defendant, a bad settlement results under the pro tonto method where the nonsettling defendant is forced to make up the difference between the amount of the
judgment and the amount that has been reached as a settlement between the other
parties, regardless of the non-settling defendant's percentage of fault."2
Another policy concern which relates to the allocation of a "bad" settlement
is the importance of adhering to the one satisfaction rule. The decisions which
adopt the pro tonto method indicate that the method was chosen mainly because
it conforms to the one satisfaction rule. 27 Conversely, courts which adopt the
relative culpabilities method dismiss the one satisfaction rule."
Courts
dismissing the one satisfaction rule state that when plaintiffs receive more under
the proportionate rule than the amount of the judgment, they are not receiving
more than one satisfaction, but are merely receiving more than they would have
under different circumstances. 29 Other courts which dismiss the one satisfaction
rule simply fail to address the rule and its problems when applying the
proportionate method. a°
The pro tonto approach clearly fosters the policy goal of settlement because
the non-settling defendant's responsibility to satisfy the judgment is uncertain and
non-settling defendants may fear that they will be forced to pay an amount which
is unrelated to their degree of culpability.' 3' It is this uncertainty which caused
a number of courts to shy away from the pro tonto method in adopting the relative
culpabilities approach.' 32 Thus, courts find that the pro tonto method does not
adhere to the equitable goal of apportioning liability according to fault, and
therefore, the method is unfair to non-settling defendants. 33 These courts hold
that although encouragement of settlement is important, it should not overshadow
the considerations of fairness
and deterrence which apportionment according to
34
proportion of fault offers.
B. Reconciling the Methods
A reconciliation of the pro tonto and the proportionate methods is possible
and would create greater stability in the securities fraud arena. The suggested
combination of the pro tonto method and the relative culpabilities method, which
is referred to as a capped proportionate method, would apportion liability
according to proportion of fault with a cap on plaintiffs recovery being the

126. Id. at 1276.
127. See cases cited supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
128. See Franklin,884 F.2d at 1231-32.
129. Id. at 1232; MFS Mun. Income Trust, 751 F. Supp. at 285.
130. See, e.g., Smith, 827 F.2d 558; Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. 540; Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. 1256;
Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
131. Dalton, 741 F. Supp. at 160.
132. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231; Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 553.
133. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231; Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 553.
134. Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1261.
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amount of the damage judgment.135 Thus, the liability of the non-settling
defendant is the lesser of its relative fault or the difference between the total
damage award and the settlement amount.1 36 This method would satisfy the
the
courts that zealously adhere to the one satisfaction rule 137 'while following
38
equitable doctrine of fairness by apportioning liability according to fault.
If a capped proportionate method is uniformly adopted, both parties will
know before trial the effect of settlement on their case and can better evaluate the
risks of trial. The capped proportionate method minimizes litigation costs through
dismissing the needs of the parties to prepare alternative theories of the case. 39
Additionally, the discovery process is streamlined when the parties need only
support one theory of the case, which also reduces litigation costs.
Finally, litigation costs in determining fault at a good faith hearing under the
pro tonto method, or at trial under the relative culpabilities method, requires
approximately the same amount of litigation cost.' 40 Thus, the pro tonto method
does not reduce litigation costs significantly over the relative culpabilities
method.141 Therefore, since the litigation costs are approximately equal under
the relative culpabilities rule
either method, the liability allocating method under
42
should be adopted because it promotes fairness.
The pro tonto method boasts promotion of settlement based on an inequitable
apportionment of liability and the uncertainty in the amount of the damage award
for which the non-settling defendant is liable.1 43 However, uncertainty is not
diminished in apportioning liability according to fault because non-settling
defendants do not know before trial what percentage of fault for which they will
be liable nor the amount of the judgment. 44 Uncertainty for the non-settling
defendant is also preserved under a proportionate method because the settling
defendant will not be in the courtroom. Thus, the fact-finder has before it only
the non-settling defendant and may be willing to apportion more liability to a live
party rather than the empty chair of the non-settling defendant. The capped
proportionate method preserves uncertainty in adopting relative liability
apportionment.' 45 Thus, in preserving uncertainty, the capped proportionate

135. MFS Mun. Income Trust, 751 F. Supp. at 284-85; Comment, supra note 21, at 1277. See
generally First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F. Supp. 1029
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
136. Comment, supra note 21, at 1277.
137. MFS Mun. Income Trust, 751 F. Supp. at 284-85; see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying
text and text accompanying note 127.
138. MFSMun. Income Trust, 751 F. Supp. 284-85; see supranotes 73-76 and accompanying text.
139. In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d at 155; see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
140. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 553; see Donovan, 752 F.2d at 1181.
141. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 553.
142. Id.
143. Comment, supra note 21, at 1276.
144. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231.
145. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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method promotes settlement without sacrificing fair distribution of the damage
award that occurs under the pro tonto rule.
Next, the capped proportionate method places the risk of a "bad" settlement
on the plaintiff because the relative culpabilities method of apportioning fault is
adopted. 146 However, this is not unfair considering that the plaintiff maintains
the burden of proof at trial.147 Plaintiff should therefore maintain a similar
burden in the settlement context, namely, plaintiff must evaluate the percentage of
liability that it believes rests on each defendant and thus determine if a settlement
with that defendant is acceptable. 48
Finally, a capped recovery method will appease courts which are concerned
with adhering to the one satisfaction rule. The capped proportionate method
adopts the one satisfaction rule by limiting plaintiff's recovery to the amount of
the damage award. 49 Because the one satisfaction rule is one of the major
rationales courts cite when adopting the pro tonto rule, courts may be less resistent
to apportioning liability according to fault if they know the one satisfaction rule
will not be violated. 5 ' Thus, the capped proportionate rule will allow for
liability which correlates with percentage fault while adhering to traditional tort
principles which have kept courts from adopting the relative culpabilities method.
VI. CONCLUSION
The capped proportionate method provides an alternative allocative method
which encompasses the most advantageous aspects of the pro tonto method and
the relative culpabilities method. The capped proportionate method allocates
liability according to fault which is in harmony with equitable concerns for
fairness and deterrence. Settlement is promoted through the uncertainties
associated with litigation without reliance upon the threat of inequitable
distribution of liability as the force behind seeking settlement. Finally, the capped
proportionate method conforms to the one satisfaction rule which is in line with
traditional tort doctrine.
Uniform adoption of the capped proportionate method provides parties with
necessary information to understand the risks involved in settlement and litigation
in the securities fraud area. Informed parties are better equipped to reduce
litigation costs and seek mutually favorable settlements. Thus, the circuits should
adopt a uniform capped proportionate method in allocating damage liability.
Anything less will continue to promote more litigation rather than settlement.
BRIAN R. HAJICEK

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Sunrise Sec., 698 F. Supp. at 1259; see also text accompanying note 77.
See generally Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 553.
Id.
MFS Mun. Income Trust, 751 F. Supp. at 282.
See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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